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ABSTRACT
Donor-funded development NGOs are sometimes portrayed as co-opting,
privatizing or depoliticizing citizen action or social movements. This much
is implied by the term ‘NGOization’. Alternatively, NGOs can be seen as
bearers of rights-based work increasingly threatened by tighter regulation or
substitution by corporate social responsibility models of development. This
article engages critically with both perspectives. It traces the role of NGOs
and their funders in agenda setting, specifically in bringing the previously
excluded issue of caste discrimination into development policy discourse in
the form of a Dalit-rights approach in Tamil Nadu, south India. The authors
explore the institutional processes of policy making and NGO networking
involved, the alliances, entanglements of NGOs and social movements, and
the performativity of NGO Dalit rights. But at the same time, the article il-
lustrates how NGO institutional systems have constrained or failed to sustain
such identity-based claims to entitlement. In Nancy Fraser’s terms, the art-
icle explores success and failure in addressing ‘first-order’ issues of justice,
that is rights to resources (in this case, land), and in tackling ‘second-order’
injustices concerning the framing of who counts (who can make a claim as
a rights holder) and how (by what procedures are claims and contests staged
and resolved). This draws attention to the important but fragile achieve-
ments of NGOs’ discursive framings that give Dalits the ‘right to have
rights’.
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INTRODUCTION
There has been a shift from the critique of development as an ‘anti-politics’
discourse (Ferguson, 1994) to ethnographies of development as the practice
of politics in varied social-historical circumstances (Mosse, 2013). ‘Devel-
opment’ articulates aspirations, connects to resource flows and is a site for
struggles over the terms of recognition and citizenship (ibid.). But inter-
national development remains a discourse constituted by exclusions. One
such exclusion (in India and internationally) is caste. Inherited caste identity
is an important determinant of life opportunity in India’s caste-networked
economy, and a continuing aspect of poverty, inequality and social exclu-
sion, especially for Dalits (those subordinated as ‘untouchable’) (Mosse,
2018). Caste has always been pivotal in India’s cultural and electoral pol-
itics (Teltumbde, 2017) but remains marginal to mainstream development
discourse, and absent from the social characteristics of concern, such as
gender, race or age, in the Sustainable Development Goals.
Why caste is kept out of development is a question discussed elsewhere
(Mosse, 2020). This article examines efforts in the 2000s to draw caste into
the frame of international development, reworked as the right of Dalits to
development resources alongside political rights and social justice. We con-
sider the role of NGOs here and ask three key questions. First, what made
it possible for the hitherto excluded vernacular politics of caste to enter and
become central to NGO development policy in the late 1990s? Second, what
were the implications of this ‘Dalitization’ of development for the NGO
field, especially given the confrontation of NGOs with caste power embed-
ded in local state bureaucracy that a focus on Dalits and rights involved?
Third, why was it difficult to sustain the NGO policy focus on caste discrim-
ination and Dalit rights?
We use two fieldwork cases from Tamil Nadu, south India: one focuses
on the effects of a higher-order advocacy network for Dalit rights; the other
examines grassroots activism for the recovery of alienated Dalit land. These
cases raise a fourth question: how do NGOs combine ‘movement work’ (Al-
varez, 2009) — that is networking, coalition building, advocacy and popular
protest — with the funding, reporting or projectized relationships of ‘NGO-
ing’ (Hilhorst, 2003; Lewis and Schuller, 2017: 642)? We consider the
relationship between the discursive and the organizational relations aspects
of NGO networks; between their ‘expressive’ and their ‘instrumental’ di-
mensions (Knutsen, 2012). While the cases highlight instability and disarray
alongside material and discursive achievements of NGO networks, they also
challenge the preconception of donor-funded NGOs as co-opting, privatiz-
ing or depoliticizing citizen action, acting as contractors of state or capital
rather than agents of the oppressed, as the notion of ‘NGOization’ often
implies (Bornstein and Sharma, 2016; Ismail and Kamat, 2018; Kamat,
2002, 2004). Finally, the article indicates the importance of NGOs in
addressing second-order injustice, that is the ‘framing’ of what counts as an
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issue and who counts (who can make a claim as a rights holder), and how
(by what procedures claims and contests are staged and resolved) (Fraser,
2005: 85).
We draw on research undertaken from two different perspectives within a
broader project titled ‘Caste Out of Development’. The first traces a policy
process in the world of NGO donors, in part from participation in that world.
David Mosse recalls policy work as a donor representative in southern India
in the 1990s1 and returns to trace a two-decade-long institutional sequel,
finding long-term shifts in NGO partner organizations and networks. He
discovers how caste became a central policy issue, mobilizing new forms of
network and public action by and for Dalits; but also how, within little more
than a decade, caste and ‘Dalit rights’ had been ousted from policy vision
again and Dalit NGO networks were in disarray. Over the course of months
between 2009 and 2012, as he sat, talked and lodged with key leaders and
members of unravelling networks in Tamil Nadu, there was every reason for
both Indian and European players in the drama to want to turn over events
and reflect on what had happened and why.
As part of the same research project, Sundara Babu Nagappan was em-
bedded in a Dalit NGO network deploying a ‘rights-based’ approach in
struggles over Dalit land dispossession. He experienced the tactics of grass-
roots activists who successfully combined the political performances of a
social movement with the proceduralism (legal/technical) of an NGO, dis-
tinctively targeting caste power networked in the local bureaucracy. He
subsequently witnessed the failure of the coalition of activists to pre-
vent the acquisition of Dalit village land for allocation to a multinational
company.
The fieldwork on which this article is based took place in 2009–12. We
summarize themes from a vast archive of NGO documentation2 and in-depth
individual and group interviews, including David’s interviews with over 120
Dalit NGO staff, leaders and network members, church leaders, interna-
tional NGO donors, Indian bureaucrats, activists and international organi-
zation officials (e.g., World Bank, UNICEF, DFID; see Mosse, 2012b), and
Sundara Babu’s 12-month (2010–11) multi-sited fieldwork with Dalit land
rights NGO networks, interviews with NGO staff and participation in work-
shops and public action.
The article has two parts. The first examines international NGO (INGO)
policy agenda setting and its transnational processes. It describes the rise of
Dalit activism, the reframing of caste in the discourse of human rights, and
the organizational imperatives that ‘Dalitized’ the agenda of one major NGO
1. David Mosse was Oxfam Regional Representative for South India in Bangalore (Ben-
galuru), 1987–91, remaining in contact in the 1990s and 2000s; NESA (see below) was
a partner in the research project.
2. Some of this takes the form of unpublished reports from the NGOs, which are listed in the
references as mimeos.
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donor (Oxfam) in southern India.3 It explores policy processes that manipu-
late categorical distinctions between INGO, NGO and social movements.
The second part analyses two different NGO approaches to Dalit rights
activism. In one, INGOs promoted higher-order network forms needed
to promote caste justice; in the other, NGOs directly challenged bureau-
cratic power locally over the alienation of Dalit land, as well as regionally
and internationally in mobilization against a state-supported multinational
company.4
THE ‘DALITIZATION’ OF DEVELOPMENT POLICY
NGOs and the Rise of Dalit Activism
The 1990s was a decade of renewed Dalit activism. While nationally public
debate over the extension of affirmative action ‘reservations’ in public sec-
tor jobs and higher education made caste visible beyond the village, in south
India an upsurge in anti-Dalit violence and killing fuelled social movements
and Dalit political parties (HRW, 1999; Rawat and Satyanarayana, 2016).
The birth-centenary of Dalit leader Dr B.R. Ambedkar increased his status
as a political icon, and his writing (newly available in vernacular languages)
crystallized a Dalit/caste critique of Marxian and feminist frameworks
within student, youth and women’s organizations.
Dalit activism was led by a professional Dalit elite (government of-
ficials, doctors, lawyers, teachers, ex-servicemen), the Scheduled Caste
(SC) associations of public sector employees in the railways, banks or
food corporations, Dalit members of parliament in various parties, Left
movement leaders, and the charismatic founders of new Dalit political
parties (Gorringe, 2005). The political space for Dalits, closed off in the
decades following Indian Independence, began to open. In Tamil Nadu,
NGOs and churches found new connections to this heterogeneous Dalit
politics (Mosse, 2012a: 193–97, 208–32) that had hitherto been avoided.
By the 1990s, there was a mutual entanglement of actor categories in
which church-formed or trained NGOs produced cadres, who promoted
movements, which accessed resources from NGOs, which provided skills
for political leaders, whose parties NGO workers joined. A first genera-
tion of Dalits to become NGO leaders in the 1970s were those freed from
agrarian subordination by the mobility of their fathers (and less commonly
3. We take Oxfam as an example, recognizing that there were parallel but distinct processes
affecting other INGOs, as explained in Mosse (2012b).
4. An important caveat is necessary. This article is not an analysis of Dalit movements and
politics in India (or Tamil Nadu) in general, their roots, trajectory and challenges (on which
there is a now a large literature); its focus is on international development NGOs’ interface
with this Dalit activism.
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mothers) as teachers, or in the army or railways; these NGO leaders were
trained and mentored in Liberation Theology/Marxian thinking by Chris-
tian priests in student organizations (mostly Christian, see Arun, 2012). To
these few were added, in the 1980s and 1990s, many Dalits with personal
experience of village untouchability, and of being ‘burned by the fire of dis-
crimination’ (as one put it) when working as community animators within
non-Dalit NGOs and Left movements. They formed NGOs to work in their
own localities for Dalit access to common property, public spaces, land or
house-site titles, water, roads or electricity, and engaged in vernacular strug-
gles over caste dignity at temples/churches or funeral sites.5
At the time, such activity did not register as ‘development’ with the INGO
funders to whom Dalit-led NGOs turned, and so had to be translated in their
proposals and reports into prevailing policy categories.6 In the case of Ox-
fam, the prevailing economization of poverty and ‘culturalization of caste’
(Natrajan, 2011; see also Mosse, 2020) meant that caste was regarded as
part of the context of Oxfam’s programme — deepening agrarian poverty
and inequality — but not as an organizing principle behind it; it was ‘best
dealt with indirectly in ways which diffuse rather than amplify conflict’.7
It was as landless labourers or marginal farmers that Dalits predominated
among project beneficiaries, and caste was avoided in explaining the need
for literacy, training or Freirean awareness raising. When demand came for
more strategic coherence in grant-making policy from head office, as surely
it did (for example in 1989–90), it was issues of gender, environment or
drought vulnerability that provided salient categories, not caste inequality.
Moreover, neoliberal institutionalist policy trends in the early 1990s brought
the rhetoric of participation, local institution building, user associations, or
microfinance Self-Help Groups as the substitute ‘technology’ of people’s
mobilization (Elyachar, 2005)8 — the terms in which the Indian govern-
ment’s 8th Five-Year Plan sought to enrol NGOs in restructuring rural de-
velopment — all of which evaded the caste question.
By the early 2000s, things had entirely changed. NGO activity in Tamil
Nadu was now significantly funded in terms of a ‘Dalit rights’ agenda. A
vernacular politics had entered the international NGO world. This was not,
however, a globalization from the grassroots. Indeed, the ‘Dalitization’ of
5. Sometimes, being dependent on non-Dalit ‘parent’ NGOs for access to foreign funds, Dalit
NGO leaders felt their work was appropriated, and complained of a caste-based division
between the raisers of money and the performers of activities (Picherit, 2018: 358); as one
Dalit objected, ‘collecting news cuttings of our action, that is the “fieldwork” of non-Dalit
NGOs’ (interview Dalit NGO leader, November 2009).
6. David reviewed scores of such documents in the late 1980s as the Bangalore-based repre-
sentative of Oxfam (UK).
7. Page 4 of the ‘Bi-annual Report 1989–90’ from the Bangalore Office (Oxfam India Trust)
submitted to Oxfam UK (David Mosse, personal collection).
8. ‘Annual Report, 1991’ from the Bangalore Office (Oxfam India Trust) submitted to Oxfam
UK (David Mosse, personal collection).
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development began in transnational institutional fields: first, the realm of
international human rights, and second, the institutional interests of INGO
donors; we take each in turn.
International Human Rights and ‘Dalit Rights’ Discourse
The realm of international human rights afforded a set of pre-existing in-
stitutional links for reframing caste as a development matter. From 1996,
caste discrimination gained recognition as a violation of human rights at
the United Nations (UN), as a consequence not of Dalit advocacy coalitions
per se, but rather of an interaction between the agendas of UN experts and
state delgates (Aranguren, 2011). India had been reporting on the state of its
Scheduled Castes and Tribes (SCs/STs) or Dalits to CERD (the Committee
on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination) — the expert monitoring com-
mittee for the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (ICERD) — from the time of its formation in 1970;
but in 1996, it ceased to do so on the grounds that caste did not fall under the
provisions of CERD since racial discrimination of any kind did not exist in
India’s territory. Aranguren (2011) links this refusal to report to CERD to the
consequences of India’s 1989 Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribes (SC/ST)
Prevention of Atrocities Act, or PoA, which, for the first time, produced
numerical data on legally defined violations (or ‘atrocities’) against Dal-
its, revealing not only the high volume but also the increasing rate of what
would be indicators of poor human rights performance under CERD.
In the face of this state refusal, Aranguren argues, CERD experts asserted
an independent exegetic function insisting on a broadened interpretation of
race, beyond a narrow biological/pheonotype concept to wider social dis-
crimination; and (in the absence of Indian government reporting) for the first
time accepted the report of a non-official (Canadian) Dalit diaspora NGO9
on descent-based (caste) discrimination in India. This not only marked a sig-
nificant shift in CERD in 1996, it also brought caste explicitly into the notion
of ‘descent’ as a prohibited basis of discrimination under ICERD (formally
so by 2002, despite the Indian goverment’s refusal to accept this), so making
the international human rights treaty apparatus available for Dalit activists
(Waughray, 2009: 191-92). Meanwhile, following the success of campaigns
against apartheid in South Africa by 1994, Human Rights Watch (among
other organizations) turned its attention to India and discrimination against
Dalits in its 1999 report, Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s ‘Un-
touchables’ (HRW, 1999); and international church networks increasingly
turned to the plight of their majority Dalit Christian populations in India
(Bob, 2007; Steur, 2012).
9. The Toronto-based Ambedkar Center for Justice and Peace (Aranguren, 2011: 34)
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India’s NGO Dalit activists could use the idea that theirs was part of a
universal struggle against the violation of human rights, unbound to the par-
ticularities of India, Hinduism or Brahmanic domination. It involved a cri-
tique of the Indian state apparatus from outside, not for the abuse of citi-
zens, or legislative failings but, as Mehta (2013) points out, for the vio-
lence of state neglect: the failure to meet obligations to Dalits, manifest in
development disparities (poverty, illiteracy, infant mortality), dispossession
of land, failure to spend the mandated proportional (population-equivalent)
Dalit development budget allocations, and failure of protection from un-
touchability and anti-Dalit violence.10 This was all set out in a ‘Black Paper’
on caste inequality and development released in December 1998 by the Na-
tional Campaign on Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR, 1999), a body headed
by Dalit NGO leaders from southern India that came out of the national
coordination of Dalit organizations in 1997–98 around issues raised in the
preparation of the HRW Broken People report, prompted and funded by the
Ford Foundation (Bob, 2007: 178–80).
This campaign for Dalit human rights was also a challenge to liberals to
see the bearers of rights not just as autonomous individuals, but as a dis-
tinct group, historical victims of exploitation and untouchability, to whom
the Indian state has a duty under the Constitution (Mehta, 2013: 153). It
forged a new alliance between NGOs and Dalit movements/parties (the Lib-




, Republican Party of India) who partici-
pated in the launch of the Black Paper (Gorringe, 2005: 76). The campaign
aimed to elicit state action by appeal to the Indian public as well as by a
politics of shaming (Mehta, 2013: 157) through international fora such as,
pre-eminently, the 2001 UN World Conference Against Racism (WCAR) in
Durban, at which many hundreds of Dalit activists (NGO and political) cam-
paigned using slogans such as ‘caste is race’ or ‘India’s hidden apartheid’ to
have caste recognized as a global form of discrimination.
While the Dalit campaign and advocacy coalition failed to get caste onto
the multilateral agenda defining governmental policy making and moni-
toring because it was blocked by the Indian government and pushed out
by competing interest coalitions (Aranguren, 2011), the new international
discourse of Dalit rights did make caste available for other development-
oriented institutional agendas.
An INGO Policy Process
The transnationally shaped Dalit human rights discourse became embed-
ded in Tamil Nadu NGO practice in the late 1990s, significantly because it
10. As prescribed by the so-called ‘Special Component Plan’ (SCP) or Scheduled Castes Sub-
Plan (SCSP) and the above-mentioned PoA legislation (for Tamil Nadu, see Alphonse,
2012; Ramaiah, 2007).
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was adopted by INGO donors. This happened as caste/Dalit issues, hith-
erto marginal to development goals, became important in demonstrating
the donors’ commitment to the rising, if ill-defined, ‘rights-based approach’
focusing on discrimination, inequality and claims on the state (Cornwall and
Nyamu-Musembi, 2004).11 The idea of ‘rights’ implied that INGO donors
and their partners would have to go beyond local projects and align them-
selves to goals of transformational change by means of supra-local action
for global justice and against human rights violations (Anandhi, 2017). But
organizations adopt new policies not on the basis of ideas alone, but be-
cause of the work ideas do to resolve their own dilemmas. In the case of Ox-
fam, to which we now turn, a new Dalit rights agenda in fact achieved two
important things: it produced success out of failure; and continuity out of
rupture.
First, success out of failure. In the 1990s, Oxfam, like many INGOs across
south India, faced a problem. From work in the Oxfam field office at that
time, David recalls that the approach to ‘people’s empowerment’ through
NGO-promoted village/neighbourhood associations (called sangams) was
perceived as not working. Field reports arriving at Oxfam and other donor
offices were reaching similar conclusions: a now standardized approach
multiplied sangams which, rather than fostering autonomous grassroots
action (for land, services etc.), became beneficiary clients expecting de-
liverable schemes and inputs from their NGO patrons who were, in turn,
institutionalized through donor support. Adopting the self-critical dis-
course on NGOization, donor staff, in varied texts, policy workshops and
strategy reviews, began to see NGOs as the problem and to distinguish
the federated associations or ‘people’s organizations’ (the worthy end)
from donor-funded NGOs (the temporary means). While informed by a
moral discourse on righteous social movements and unaccountable NGOs
(Bornstein and Sharma, 2016: 82), this representation bore little relation
to the reality of clientelist relationships in which donors were themselves
embedded.
The Dalit rights politics of the 1990s allowed Oxfam to view NGO action
and the sangam process rather differently. Reframing programme objectives
in terms of Dalit assertion of social-political rights — as a 1997 report
did (Parasuraman and Vimalanathan, 1997) — involved a reorganization
of categories. The growing number of small Dalit-led NGOs whose staff
worked in their own localities could be construed as really being people’s
organizations. Their caste-based activism — struggles over land, temples,
social boycotts and anti-Dalit violence — locally initiated but regionally
interconnected through expanding Dalit NGO networks and internationally
11. Recent disenchanted assessments of rights-based approaches describe impacts being limited
by vague definitions, procedural rights (consultation, participation) being prioritized over
substantial rights (e.g., to land or housing), and the hegemony of target results (not rights)
(Nelson and Dorsey, 2018).
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salient, was now evaluated as a kind of self-organizing movement for struc-
tural change. This offered a holistic (material, social, spiritual) perspective
on dignity and development beyond projects, to which — as our interviews
made clear — jaded European agencies could reconnect. It provided a way
out of the failures of the sangam model and the elusive goal of ‘empower-
ment’. It is not that a Dalit rights policy changed practice, but rather that
it provided new interpretive possibilities (and thus new resource flows),
bringing a range of existing but hitherto unrecognized social struggles into
a rejuvenated framework of development goals.
The second work of Dalit rights policy was to produce continuity out
of rupture. Oxfam brought its new vision of Dalit-led development to the
fore at the precise moment of a central decision to close its south India
programme (the oldest, started in 1962), to rationalize, cut management
costs and, like many INGOs, refocus on the relatively poorer northern In-
dian states. To put the matter simply, the notion of development as a self-
sustaining struggle for Dalit rights offered an ethical narrative with which
to clothe institutional abandonment, with all its material consequences, and
handle the resentment and resistance of some 48 NGOs who pressed their
claims to partnership. In practice, Oxfam negotiated exit by, in March 1998,
transferring its programme and assets to a self-governing network of 42
mostly Dalit-led NGOs, ambiguously titled the New Entity for Social Ac-
tion, or NESA — part donor (Oxfam, then Novib), part membership body —
firmly aligned to a ‘rights-based approach’ that now articulated the cultural-
political assertions of Dalits.
At the time, the first local council (Panchayat) elections were taking place
after the 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act (1993) mandated reserving
constituencies for Dalits and women. Many saw this as changing the field
and putting development resources in the hands of Dalit women and men as
Panchayat leaders — an interpretation only emphasized by the extreme vio-
lence unleashed against Dalits standing for election, including the notorious
massacre of six Dalits of Melavalavu (near Madurai), including beheading
the elected President in June 1997 (HRW, 1999). Never had NGOs more to
contribute; continuity was essential. This was no time to abandon a rights-
based development programme.
THE CONSEQUENCES OF ‘DALIT RIGHTS’ IN NGO PRACTICE
Making Dalit struggle and the failure of the state to protect this constituency
an explicit focus of rights-based development action had implications for
NGOs. On the one hand, they newly targeted untouchability, caste exclusion
from land and water, from commons, services and schools, public spaces
and political participation, and used the PoA law otherwise out of reach
for vulnerable Dalit communities. The Dalit rights focus validated talk of
dignity, ‘the moving force’ behind all development, as one NGO leader put
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it to David,12 such that debt-bonded Dalit labourers would mobilize first
to have their own burial/cremation ground or to be served tea in the same
glasses as others in the village teashop.
On the other hand, targeting caste-based injustice brought new obstacles
and risks. Dalit NGOs faced inaction or resistance when they took up cases
of caste-based violence, or retaliatory ‘social boycotts’13 such as that im-
posed by upper castes on Dalit youth in the village of Irunjirai when the
latter asserted their statutory right to use the village barbering and laundry
services (Arulnathan, 2012). Activists claimed the route to justice, includ-
ing registration of cases under the PoA, was blocked by the local police,
bureaucrats and politicians who were caste-connected to the perpetrators of
injustice (Ramaiah, 2007), and who also diverted development resources in-
tended for Dalits.14 ‘If we file a case’, said an NGO worker, ‘there won’t be
any inquiry for evidence’.15 Indeed, NGO activists told us that recourse to
the police or legal action often provoked counter-cases against victims by
the perpetrators of anti-Dalit injustice while Dalit rights activism was crim-
inalized. As one head put it, ‘you can work for Dalits but to work as Dalits
is politically dangerous’. You may organize separate caste associations, but
‘if you put “Dalit liberation” on your board they will attack you’.16
One way or another, for the many small Dalit-led development NGOs,
a focus on caste-based abuse made local action difficult. It strained rela-
tions with the local bureaucracy, restricting access to state-funded schemes
or state-regulated foreign donor funding, increasing political and financial
risk, and creating reliance on local sponsors and volunteer workforces.17
The next sections illustrate two responses to this dilemma. The first focuses
on a strategy of de-localizing claims by creating supra-local forums able
to assemble knowledge and authoritative intervention to circumvent local
caste/bureaucratic obstacles to justice. This involves what Latour calls ‘scal-
ing’ (2005: 184–85), that is, actor strategies to recontextualize interactions
so as to enrol the interests of distant others, to mobilize large-scale agendas
12. Interview, Dalit NGO network leader, southern Tamil Nadu, November 2009.
13. The closure of all local shops, services and employment to Dalits; see Carswell and De
Neve (2015).
14. At one Dalit NGO network meeting, a staff member stated, ‘the person who does work for an
Arunthathiyar, Paraiyar and Pallar [Dalit castes] is a Brahmin. How can he do [that work]?
If you take the Adi Dravidar [Dalit] Welfare Department, 90 per cent of the officers are BC
[non-Dalit dominant caste] people. So they can’t implement [the schemes]’. He went on to
illustrate by pointing out that the eight vehicles in the local town which had been allocated
through grant/loans scheme obtained in the name of Paraiyars [Dalits], were owned and run
by Servarars [a dominant caste] (discussion in Paravai network, Manamadurai, February
2010).
15. Discussion in Paravai network, Manamadurai, February 2010.
16. Interview, Dalit NGO network leader, southern Tamil Nadu, November 2009.
17. Of course, as a reviewer correctly pointed out, in practice the relationships among Dalits,
activists and the bureaucracy are locally variable, moderated by factors such as the presence
of elected Dalit officials.
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while shifting back to local disputes. This created an extensive regional Dalit
NGO network, the dynamics and varied effects of which we examine. The
second response was to target the local state directly, especially by transpos-
ing those obstructing encounters with the bureaucracy to the public arena
through street protest mobilized under the banner of social movements or
fronts (iyakkam or pēravai) — the federated youth or women’s groups hav-
ing ‘different rights in public space’ (Picherit, 2018: 362) — set up in par-
allel to the registered (funded) NGO. In the first case, we find local activism
gaining coherence as it is amplified and translated into a regional discourse
on Dalit rights, while in the second, local activism on recovering Dalit land
requires tactical camouflaging of the caste basis of claims.
Dalit NGO Networking and its Implications
In the late 1990s, Dalit NGOs in Tamil Nadu were part of a complex organi-
zational field. In each district or region key NGO leaders had risen to promi-
nence with ideological and material influence over clusters of small NGOs,
some established by former members of their staff, some funded by chan-
nelled foreign contributions. These local NGO clusters were provided with
political and legal support to oppose caste injustice, sometimes through al-
liance with Dalit movements or political parties active in the regions, which
in turn gained from the spaces and resources opened up by NGOs.18
Foreign donor INGOs played a part in forging such networks. From 1999,
Oxfam — having endorsed a shift to Dalit rights as part of its exit policy —
was bound to increase rather than decrease support to vulnerable NGOs in
need of training, legal backing and advocacy from higher-order networks.
District-level Dalit NGO groupings were thus consolidated into named
networks linked to the State-wide body, NESA (now funded by Dutch
Oxfam-Novib). This was by no means a harmonious set of alliances around
the agenda of ‘Dalit rights’. The Dalit rights agenda was ambiguous and the
new networks heterogeneous. They enrolled NGOs with different views and
approaches, providing a new context for competitive NGO identity differen-
tiation, while reshaping debates (see Mosse, 2012b). There were new points
of contention: was the focus on caste — as Dalit or specific jātis (castes)
— a virtue, a necessity, or a risk? Did we confront, or were we co-opted
by, the state; and were Dalit political parties to be sought out as protective,
or vilified for compromise, corruption and kat.t. ā panchayats (that is, con-
flict broker dealing)? NESA members focusing on microfinance might be
judged for their caste-inclusive individualizing schemes, or for adopting a
18. For example, one of the first Dalit NGO networks to be formed, Paravai (in the south-
ern Sivagangai district), joined hands with a Pallar caste movement, the Martyr Immanuel
Front; other networks, including the eastern districts’ Marudhan, worked closely with the
Dalit Liberation Panthers Party.
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‘Chettiyar’ (dominant merchant ‘banking’ caste) cultural style, including
religious gifting and public feeding — as witnessed by David, sitting in the
charitable food hall of a particularly large Dalit microfinance NGO in
central Tamil Nadu in 2009. Some NGO workers also criticized the photo-
taking, report-writing, fame-seeking, time-wasting, non-local human rights
NGOs failing to follow through or grasp specific contexts and tactics of
Dalit struggle.19
The post-Oxfam new-entity NESA financed and organized information
and training support (on legal rights or state schemes), public awareness
and policy lobbying events across Dalit development ‘sectors’ including
anti-atrocity human rights, Panchayati Raj (elected local government), Dalit
women’s issues, natural resources, and microcredit. These ‘sectors’ each
centred on different member networks (see Mosse, 2012b). NESA’s most
prominent activity was the promotion of further network entities, includ-
ing for example the Dalit Panchayat Presidents’ Forum, coming out of the
first State-level Convention of Dalit Presidents in April 2001. That year,
over 1,000 Dalits contested elections and by 2003 the Forum had some 700
members across 11 districts. There was a Dalit Lawyers’ Forum, a Dalit
Women’s NGO network, and most prominently a State-level umbrella net-
work of Dalit NGO networks, the increasingly autonomous Human Rights
Forum for Dalit Liberation (Tamil Nadu) or HRFDL, bringing together 14
district-level Dalit NGO networks — some 200 interlinked NGOs — as a
‘state-level political platform on behalf of Dalits’ (NESA, 2003: 12).
Of course, the networks connected through HRFDL were heterogeneous
with distinct regional histories, types of NGOs, big-personality leaders and
political connections. As fields of power and reputation, network interre-
lations were characterized by a mixture of collaboration, competition and
antagonism. They had different contexts and prioritized different concerns.
For example, NGOs in two southern Tamil Nadu networks worked in the
context of assertive Dalit (Pallar caste) politics and retaliatory violence;
those in the western region responded to persistent forms of debt bondage
(agrarian and industrial), or illegal ‘manual scavenging’; in other districts
NGOs came together over the exploitation of female migrant workers, di-
verted state housing or credit schemes, threats to Dalit officers, alienation
of Dalit land or commons resources, or caste-based sexual violence. Link-
age to HRFDL allowed the injustices they confronted to be ‘scaled’, be-
coming legally visible and actionable through supra-local formal mech-
anisms, monitoring and fact-finding missions. Among the large number of
cases ‘scaled’ through HRFDL’s Fact Finding Team and Dalit Lawyers’
Forum, included in just one annual report (HRFDL, 2007) were a case
of the eviction of Dalits from land assigned for post-tsunami housing for
fisherfolk in a coastal village, the barring of Arunthathiyars (Dalits) from
19. A point of view expressed in local NGO network discussions such as with Paravai, Mana-
madurai, February 2010.
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fire-walking rituals and temple entry by dominant castes, and (in another
village) attacks by upper-caste Reddiyar youth when Dalits conducted their
own festival procession accompanied by honorific mēl.am temple drums and
nākacuvaram wind instruments. Police complaints led to a ‘social boycott’
imposed on the Dalits: refusal to sell them goods from village shops, cutting
their cable TV connections, blocking their drinking water supply. The Dalit
sub-postmaster in this caste-divided village was prevented from conducting
his office.
Also reported from other villages were: Dalit exclusion from common
property fishing and the right to cut fodder grass; a teacher telling Dalit stu-
dents they had no reason to register themselves for a Republic Day sports
event; several cases of insults and assaults of Dalit men and women in public
spaces including on buses; the rape of a Dalit woman and a young woman’s
suicide believed to have been induced by upper-caste harassment; and two
murders of Dalit Panchayat Presidents in the same (Tirunelveli) district just
three months apart (in 2006–07) (HRFDL, 2007). HRFDL responded to pe-
titions, gave ‘moral support’, provided legal advice on filing cases under the
SC/ST Prevention of Atrocities Act, pressed abandoned cases with the po-
lice and revenue officers, organized public agitations, and arbitrated through
village-level ‘peace talks’.
The network’s judicialized activism (Bornstein and Sharma, 2016) raised
and recontextualized such issues in regional, national and international
oversight bodies (State or National Human Rights or Scheduled Caste Com-
missions, the UN Commission on Human Rights) and used instruments
such as State-wide consultations and public hearings with jury panels. For
example, a national public hearing was held in June 2005, co-organized with
the Liberation Panthers Party (Vit.utalai Cir¯
uttaikal. Kat.ci) and NCDHR, on
the 10-year-long exclusion of Dalits from Panchayat elections by locally
dominant Thevar castes in certain constituencies reserved for Dalits.20 As
Lama-Rewal (2018) explains, although not formal judicial procedures,
such public hearings prepare the ground for trials, and point to national or
international legal frameworks. They articulate the specific instance so as to
point to the general issue; and the evidence/documentation of Dalit rights
abuse, and the emotionally laden performances by victims of atrocities who
are selected and rehearsed as witnesses, serve to educate and sensitize their
audiences from affected communities, the public, media and state officials
(ibid.). While it is true that the state’s unwillingness to act on the findings
of public hearings and judicial commissions shows the limits of such NGO
activism,21 when performed as ‘a representation in the theatrical sense
20. Jury Panel Report of the National Public Hearing on Papapatti, Keeripatti, Nattarman-
galam and Kottakachiyenthal. Jointly organized by Liberation Panther Party, HRFDL-TN,
NCDHR, People’s Watch-Tamilnadu, at SOCO Trust, Madurai, 14 June 2005 (Gorringe,
2017).
21. We are grateful to a reviewer for this reminder.
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of the term’ (ibid.: 13) these public hearings nonetheless had important
discursive effects.
Affiliation to the network as a scaling effect also provided small Dalit
NGOs with a kind of institutional capital. ‘Power contagion’ was the NESA
Executive Director’s phrase for entry into imagined collectivities at State
and national levels. Then, the network could be scaled horizontally, imag-
ined (especially by its INGO donors) as a mass organization, a State-wide
federation of NGO-promoted community-based organizations (CBOs) —
the Nayaya Sangama — to which the network would, in time, be handed over
(Barton et al., 2000: 16; NESA, 1998; Oxfam Novib, n.d.). Lower-order
NGO networks and a grassroots base were needed as a legitimizing con-
stituency, such as to engage the attention of Dalit politicians, who could then
be advertised in events, rallies and mass poster and signature campaigns.
These included the campaigns preceding the 2001 Durban anti-racism
conference, or the 2003 Asian Social Forum (Hyderabad) and 2004 World
Social Forum (Mumbai) which articulated caste issues into other global
agendas such as anti-globalization and claimed — questionably, according
to Jaoul (2017) — to represent ordinary Dalits to international publics.22
By the end of 2004, when David visited, NESA-HRFDL comprised a
powerful representational machinery. Through its vast array of trainings,
events, fellowships, research, films, publications and public hearings, this
NGO super-network had established a Dalit political-cultural optic for
viewing everything from microfinance to HIV/AIDS, and pointed to the
interlinked capacities of some 216 NGOs and a mass constituency of 2.5
million Dalit women and men. HRFDL worked because it created a ‘dis-
cursive field of action’ that interlinked diverse Dalit rights actors (Alvarez,
2009: 177) while engaging local and regional publics, State and donor
aid institutions, including the UK’s DFID. In fact, former expatriate DFID
advisors interviewed during the research indicated that they had sought
connections to varied Dalit NGO networks to support different positions on
caste in aid programming in the early 2000s.23
The NGO network not only sustained a discursive field of Dalit rights, it
also produced itself as a parallel to — even a simulation of — Dalit social
movements. It was an unregistered, flexible, overlapping and shape-shifting
entity that reached across regions, social (caste) groups and party-political
affiliations. Goal ambiguity allowed enrolment onto, and the shaping of, the
network by diverse members and purposes (see Youngblood, 2016). It was
activated around particular events/issues and, like a social movement, found
focus in the personalized fields of key leaders with followings. These were
the convening nodal NGO heads — one was the focus of activities on hu-
man rights violations, another on Panchayati Raj, a third on Dalit women’s
22. Anandhi (2017) explores the ambivalent impact of this turn to Dalit transnational networks
on Dalit women’s NGO work in Tamil Nadu.
23. Interviews with DFID Social Development Advisers, London, July and August 2011.
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issues — through whom, as a matter of pragmatic necessity, HRFDL
was aid-funded as a programme (of individual NGOs) who then further
dispersed donor funding as grants to smaller NGOs in their networks.
Power and position came from being an intersection in the channelling and
circulating of resources — a cultural style of leadership familiar to scholars
of southern India, from Dirks’s (1987) work on kingship to Bate’s (2009)
on Tamil party politics. Absent was any centralized control or accounting.
The function of the NESA-HRFDL secretariat was itself incorporative
rather than administrative: enrolling more and more people, displaying
widening connections in larger-scale public conventions, rallies etc., such
that those involved would, in recollecting, stress the scale and effervescence
of a given event, the reach of the network, over particular agendas. Mean-
while, committed to promoting a movement, the key donors emphasized
non-interference, decentralization and participative informality.24
As Riles notes, such network activity has a ‘dual quality as both a means
to an end and an end in itself’ (2001: 51). Applied to NESA-HRFDL, the
‘network’ was a powerful mobilizing metaphor (such as ‘community’ might
be), not a descriptive label for a set of actual inter-NGO relations or commu-
nity associations. As a ‘storied network’, a construct that did not exist before
or outside of its enactment in happenings and events, HRFDL came into ex-
istence in what the NESA convenor later referred to as ‘bouts of visibility’.25
There was, as Edelman (2005: 39) observes of Central American peasant or-
ganizations, ‘a proclivity for demonstrating the effectiveness of the network
with reference to its own self-description and activities’. NESA-HRFDL
demonstrated a remarkable capacity for reflective self-documentation.
Watkins et al. (2012) argue that NGOs with goals of long-term transfor-
mation, and lacking technologies with known input–output relations, typ-
ically encourage mobilization rather than doing, and ‘behave in ways that
resemble culture-producing organizations, such as those that create and mar-
ket films or women’s fashions’ (ibid.: 289). But to view HRFDL as culture-
producing in this sense is not to diminish its powerful discursive and mo-
bilizing effects, underpinning the ‘human rights agenda’ as an imagined
global polity and producing its local constituency (ibid.: 286). Certainly, be-
tween 1998 and 2006, NESA-HRFDL helped create a discursive space that
attracted international donors back to south India; donors such as the French
association of Catholic movements, or CCFD,26 which would directly fund
HRFDL (sidelining NESA) for the next decade, as an investment in what
was conceived as a ‘self-organizing system’ of Dalit capacity building and
24. The NESA Executive Director tried deliberately to weaken his control over the process, and
a donor Programme Officer threatened to resign rather than intervene in a critical HRFDL
leadership struggle (interviews, Bengaluru, June–December 2010; Geneva, June 2011).
25. Interview, Bengaluru, June 2010.
26. The Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et Pour le Développement is an association of
29 movements of the Catholic Church in France. Interview, former CCFD representative,
Geneva, June 2011.
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empowerment (see Knox et al., 2006: 132) offering reach, impact and sus-
tainability.
Network Instability: Discursive Effects and Organizational Relations
NESA-HRFDL can be considered as two quite distinct phenomena. At one
level, ‘the network’ was, as explained, an end in itself, above all a discur-
sive effect that intentionally blurred distinctions between people’s organ-
izations, NGOs, networks and donors, masking financial–managerial power
relations and strategies. At a second level, NESA-HRFDL was a set of or-
ganizational relationships. It was a long-standing inter-NGO order of repu-
tation and status, patronage or factionalism, expressed in idioms of personal
ties, ideological affiliation, programme territoriality or caste membership.
In practice, donor field offices (with Oxfam and CCFD variations) devel-
oped fund-mediated relationships within this institutional order, as part of
the donor–NGO–sangam clientelist system (Picherit, 2018: 375). All those
things that disappear at the level of ‘the network’ reappear in the realm of
organizational relations.
As HRFDL grew in reach from 2004, CCFD invested in the strategic value
of a vast network of Dalit-rights NGOs whose movement work intercon-
nected caste politics and Dalit human rights, creating scale and discursive
fields of action that enhanced capacities (at many levels) to respond to anti-
Dalit injustice. Actors at all levels, not just donors, invested in the network
in this form, collaboratively producing and enacting its self-representation.
Success relied on a disjuncture between this and the network as a structure
of NGO relations, interests, routes to funds and power, and input-output au-
dits (see Mosse, 2005). This disjuncture was actively maintained as INGO
donor reports constantly bifurcated HRFDL, locating all the ‘positive gains’
(‘upwardly connecting’, ‘grounding Dalit advocacy’ etc.) at the level of the
network, and all the ‘problem areas’ (leadership, ownership, financial or out-
put monitoring etc.) in the realm of organizational relations (Chellathurai
et al., 2006: 4).
The inherent contradictions between representations and power relations
were not, of course, unnoticed by actors. As one Dalit NGO head said: ‘So
you [donor] support only networking, so I come with my own network be-
cause I want to be leader of that network; and somebody else wants to have
a network to lead. So, who is bigger; who has more groups [NGOs]’? (para-
phrased). And, he went on to ask, is the NGO an element of the ‘network’ or
the ‘network’ a programme of the NGO?27 The ‘common good’ of the su-
perordinate network was often, in practice, subordinated to the interests of
27. Interview, Dalit NGO head, Tamil Nadu, October 2009.
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the individual NGOs, especially when NGO leaders experienced networks
as a constraint on their agency, rather than extending its reach.
Correspondingly, community-level groups did not prioritize or produce
supra-local networks in the way NGOs did (Wichterich et al., 2006: 22, 26–
28). While NGOs emphasized their role as agents of grassroots capacity-
building, CBOs regarded them as a source of economic benefits tapping into
donor resources, such that one donor evaluation asks ‘are NGOs empower-
ing autonomous community-based organisations, or are CBOs being created
in the form of NGOs?’ (Barton et al., 2000: 10). And while donor staff em-
phasize process, devolution and non-interference, they work concretely to
ensure influence.
So long as the goal was promoting a Dalit rights discourse, HRFDL’s con-
cealed contradictions mattered little. But when treated as an instrument for
other purposes, the fragile articulation of network idea and organizational
process faced a crisis (Knox et al., 2006: 131). The problems began with
a physical devastation to the Tamil Nadu shoreline by the Southeast Asian
tsunami of 26 December 2004, particularly affecting Nagapattnam and Cud-
dalore districts and Karaikkal. The international fundraising and emergency
response was huge and rapid. However, even by January 2005, it was clear
that caste discrimination pervaded the relief effort (Gill, 2006). Dalit com-
munities (the 58 hamlets affected) were barred from relief supplies, offi-
cials did not visit their hamlets, non-Dalit survivors avoided food touched
by them. They were sheltered separately since upper-caste marriage halls
and the like refused them. Their land was used for the burial or cremation of
victims of the disaster, while it was Dalits who were called upon to handle
the corpses. Later it was apparent that Dalit women were subject to routine
sexual exploitation and HIV infection by post-tsunami construction workers
(Dalton et al., 2009).
This systematic discrimination is now well known, thanks largely to the
coordinated campaign of NESA-HRFDL (and NCDHR). But when HRFDL
was turned into a relief-rehabilitation agency, responding to public opinion
pressure from Europe, handling large multi-donor budgets with short time
frames and weakly imposed accounting, this taṅka-tsunami (‘gold tsunami’)
amplified existing tensions. The things that allowed the NGO network to
appear as a social movement — role ambiguity, overlapping network terri-
tories, person-centred spheres of influence — were incompatible with the
requirements of executing large-scale rehabilitation works (especially house
building after 2006).
The multiplication of donors incentivized bilateral NGO–donor rela-
tionships, weakening the network collective; and the propensity of fund-
channelling member NGOs to act as if their own office was the Secretariat
of the entire network intensified discord. Organizational inequalities were
amplified by uneven access to rehabilitation funds (between coastal and
inland networks) and rendered permanent through the institution building
enabled by post-tsunami finance. The mutual scepticism of NGOs facing
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characteristic input-to-output uncertainties, reliant on talk-based technolo-
gies (meetings, workshops, trainings, etc.) yet claiming specific impacts like
empowered Dalit panchayat presidents or land acquisitions (Watkins et al.,
2012), could, in the context of funded rehabilitation works, turn into more
concrete accusations of misappropriation or fraud. In this climate, when
the NESA Secretariat organized mass meetings at which the network-wide
people’s Nyaya Sangama members asked their own NGOs to open up pro-
posals and budgets to public scrutiny, it prompted indignation.28
NGO donors began to treat HRFDL, the network ideal, as if it were a
structure of organizational relationships, failing to perceive the ontological
disjuncture between the two phenomena. Post-tsunami, CCFD directed at-
tention to the network as having problems that required structural solutions
— restructuring, rationalizing district-level networks, centralizing coordi-
nation, governance and audit systems — the very things evaded in promot-
ing the network as a movement. Although these changes never took place,
CCFD’s new structural view of the network was taken forward through a
European Union-funded programme (2007–09) that involved the further
step of ‘projectizing’ the network: complying with agency-standard Logi-
cal Framework Analysis, identifying a beneficiary population of 2 million
Dalit people and a monitored set of activities under five themed areas. A
process of ‘NGOing’ decisively replaced the collapsed movement work of
HRFDL which was now registered as an organization, defined as a project
implementation agency, with selected network leaders being theme coordi-
nators. Quantified achievements (activities/participants) linked to ‘outputs’
were the measures of ‘success’. Failure was construed (by evaluations in
2008 and 2009) as due to weak ‘network management practices’ or the
‘limited understanding of network members regarding the overall project
objectives’, while addressing local-level Dalit rights abuses was a constraint
on HRFDL’s implementing agency role (Rugmini, 2008: 7, 21; also ADER,
2009). The new French co-funding donor intermediary, Association pour
le Développement Economique Régional (ADER), eventually pulled back
control and appointed its own experts and resource people (e.g., for train-
ing, for a District Panchayat forum) (ADER, 2009).
As the HRFDL network was instrumentalized as an implementation ma-
chinery, a new distinction was made between means and ends such that the
Dalit NGO network processes were no longer coterminous with Dalit em-
powerment, but rather readable as defective project implementation, entirely
reversing Oxfam’s original reinterpretation. Meanwhile, the State Secretary
of the newly registered HRFDL told David (in November 2009) that the con-
cept of ‘the network’ was to be done away with. As often in development,
failure was produced by policy — or at least co-produced by network actors
and the donor framework.
28. Interviews, NESA, November 2009.
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Despite the conspiracy of success in donor reporting formats, by the end
of 2009 it was evident to anyone involved that the HRFDL had lost coher-
ence and credibility; the network receded into the files and spreadsheets of
the agency computers. A few regional leaders tried to float inheritor or al-
ternative fronts; but by this time key network players had redirected their
energies by joining Dalit political parties; for instance, the HRFDL State
Convenor became Youth State Secretary of the Liberation Panther Party,
and another NESA sector head its State Organizing Secretary.
Among donors, there was stoicism. ‘We had a beautiful organic plan’,
said a CCFD officer, an ‘architectural plan’: through NGO networks and
Dalit social movement, the grassroots would be mobilized to create politi-
cal influence on the state. ‘We started to build the four walls and the roof
collapsed. One of our components — the networks — had not responded’.
And with hindsight she added, ‘If this [HRFDL] had remained as a forum
for Dalit rights it might still be there … [but] there was no one else to cover
the Dalit victims of the disaster’.29
Interestingly, when — in 2010, under new staff — CCFD reviewed
HRFDL, the focus was not on organizational problems, or even the failed
network concept, but on a crisis of the narrative of Dalit rights itself, trig-
gering a ‘de-Dalitization’ of NGO policy. The 2010 programme review con-
cluded that the politics of recognition (the focus on Dalit identity-based
claims) had become divorced from the politics of redistribution (class-based
struggle for resources), resulting in a fragmenting ‘caste-communitarian’
development.30 A ‘new’ approach — territory- rather than identity-focused
(which was really an old approach) — would bring together ‘trans-casteist’
coalitions of NGOs and social movements (Dalit, Adivasi, fisher, farmer) in
mass action on livelihood issues such as land (see below). While the dis-
tinction between Dalit and non-Dalit was blurred, a revalorizing of ‘mass
action’ against clientelist NGO networks reinstated the moral–conceptual
distinction between social movements and NGOs.
CCFD’s ‘de-Dalitization’ policy occurred within an increasingly authori-
tarian national political environment in which NGO Dalit-focused interven-
tions were curbed and losing legitimacy. External funding had reduced or
disappeared with donor withdrawal or loss of registration for foreign con-
tributions following punitive goverment audits. Various other Dalit feder-
ations, unions and NGO networks were disbanded, amidst conflicts, com-
promises, recriminations and betrayals (as David Pitcherit, 2018 notes in
Andhra Pradesh). This was not helped by the fissiparous effects of sepa-
rate Dalit jāti-based strategies, and dispersal of the Dalit NGO leadership
29. Interview, former CCFD representative, Geneva, June 2011.
30. Interviews with CCFD regional Project Officer, London, August 2011. This coincided with
a significantly broadened focus of the National Campaign on Dalit Human Rights and other
rights organizations, from caste atrocities to socio-economic rights and development bud-
geting.
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as some moved closer to political parties, others to national or international
fora. Each of these factors requires further investigation, but together they
have undoubtedly made it more difficult to sustain a development NGO fo-
cus on caste in southern India.31
We have explained how ‘scaling’ through higher-order NGO networks
was an effective response by Dalit activism locally blocked by dominant
caste threats and bureaucratic inaction. But we also found that NGO move-
ment work and its discursive effects were inherently unstable and, in this
case, unsustainable because the network implied organizational relations
(INGO and NGO) that were disruptive. But scaling was not the only re-
sponse to entrenched local caste and bureaucratic power. We turn now to
our second case which differently combined social movement and Dalit
NGO activism. Here tactics of vernacular protest were deployed alongside
NGO procedural activism, concretely targeting the local state for recovery
of alienated Dalit land.
NGO Procedural Activism and Dalit Land Dispossession
The Dalit Man.urimai Kūt.t.amaippu or Dalit Land Rights Federation (DLRF)
brings together (independently of HRFDL32) 16 NGOs across six northern
districts of Tamil Nadu. Its principal focus is recovery of what is called
Panchami or Panchama land, that is ‘wasteland’ which had been allocated
inalienably through the colonial Depressed Classes Land Act of 1892 to
Dalits (then known as Pariahs or Panchamas), thus, not to be mortgaged or
sold to any non-Dalit. At the time, the assignment of some 1.2 million acres
represented a significant change in colonial government policy which had
resolutely supported landlords in resisting claims to property from landless
Dalit labourers over whom they asserted almost total control, and who were
excluded as ‘outer-people’ in relation to the rights-bearing village commu-
nity, the Tamil ūr (Viswanath, 2014: 104).
So when, in the wake of the 1891 famine, Chingleput District Col-
lector J.H.A. Tremenheere proposed an allocation of lands to Panchamas
(unheard of beyond missionary farm settlements), he not only opened
an avenue for economic autonomy, but also gave unprecedented recog-
nition to Panchamas as resident villagers (ibid.: 96, 108). The persisting
disquiet this provoked among elites is indicated by a comment printed
in The Hindu newspaper in February 1923, that giving land to the Pan-
chamas would be ‘disastrous to the ancient religion of the country and its
31. Alongside this Indian state delegitimization of attention to caste, new awareness of the issue
has grown in countries of the diaspora, returning caste to the policy agenda among some
INGOs (see Saracini and Shanmugavelan, 2019).
32. Although also funded by CCFD as well as by the INGO ActionAid.
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ancient social system … bringing ruin and disaster upon the landowning
classes’.33
Over subsequent decades, most of the assigned Panchami land was ille-
gally acquired by non-Dalits for lack of the means to cultivate, in lieu of
crisis debt, or on migration; some was transferred to temple trusts or di-
verted to farm forestry schemes — all enabled by the poor understanding
Dalit owners had of the conditions of assignment (Moses, 2003).34 Activists
regard such systematic failure of state land allocations, including other land
gift or land ceiling redistributions, as indicating a Dalit condition of ‘chronic
dispossession’.35
The DLRF network is led by the Dalit movement (Ambedkar Pēravai)
leader C. Nicholas, one of the first-generation 1970s liberation theology
trained Dalit NGO leaders whose Integrated Rural Development Society
(IRDS) turned to the issue of land recovery in the 1990s. This was partly
to revive collective action among Dalits which had been attenuated by their
increasingly dispersed and precarious livelihoods resulting from changing
rural/urban labour markets (see Shah et al., 2018).
The turn to land brought contention. Land is awkwardly political in Tamil
Nadu amidst marketization, intensified demand for industrial sites, corpo-
rate land grabs, land banks, and a land-broker state. Secondary processes
of speculation mean that ‘land appears to be more a store of value than a
source of livelihood’ (Vijayabaskar, 2010: 42; also Levien, 2013), and given
land’s lost agricultural value, pressured debt-related sales result. But land is
also revived as a store of social value for Dalits. Indeed, Nicholas was not
just leading a ‘Polanyian countermovement’ (Goodwin, 2018) against land
commodification, but invoking the importance of land as the basis of so-
cial belonging, a share in the village wealth, sovereignty, power and status,
coded as the legal right to land and historically denied to Dalits. Land was
viewed as an end in this sense, and not just a means: ‘I have to have land to
be a person’, a Dalit woman claiming Panchami land told Sundara Babu; ‘to
have peace (ātmā cānti)’, said another. Landlessness is like ‘refugee status’
said an activist at a workshop where it was agreed that land is about the life
within it, and land rights (man. urimai) a matter of ‘life-soil’ (uyir man. ).
36
While Panchami land was emphatically a Dalit issue (repeatedly raised
by Dalit movements), the DLRF sought to take the issue out of ‘substan-
tive caste politics’ and pursue an approach of ‘procedural advocacy’ (to use
Waghmore’s 2013 distinction), not least because of the violent and lethal
caste confrontation over Panchami land in the 1990s (notably Dalit deaths
33. The Hindu, 23 February 1923, quoted in Viswanath (2014: 164).
34. As of 2012, only 10 per cent (115,841.24 acres) of the 1.2 million acres of ‘Depressed
Classes’ land in Tamil Nadu existed in government records, of which 17 per cent was occu-
pied by non-Dalits (Murthy, 2017).
35. Views expressed at a State-level consultation on building a coalition on land rights held in
Tiruchirappalli (29–30 September 2010).
36. From conversations recorded in fieldnotes during 2010.
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from police gunfire in Karanai village in 1994) which had largely failed to
sustain either land acquisition or the Dalit land movement itself.37 Nicholas,
who himself witnessed bloody caste riots in Villupuram district in the late
1970s, recognized that as a matter of rights the critical battle over land was
to be fought within the bureaucracy not within the sights of police rifles,
and that the state apparatus itself (not caste communities) was the critical
site of networked caste power. Moreover, contrasting with other Panchami
struggles, Dalit women would be centred as the principal public actors and
claimants. Control over knowledge, and what was revealed or concealed in
land records, was the necessary first battle.
In simple terms (although far from simple), land records were used to
identify Panchami land, to cancel existing titles and allocate land to landless
Dalit families, registered in the name of (mostly married) women, the secure
custodians and managers of assets. Until Chief Minister M.G. Ramachan-
dran’s 1981 Tamil Nadu Abolition of Village Officers Act, records were in
the possession of hereditary upper-caste village officers, the karn. ams, and it
was virtually impossible to identify Panchami land. Sundara Babu remem-
bers as a boy nervously crossing the agraharam (Brahman street) past the
third house where he would look up with awe to see the karn. am sitting on
a high porch, like a high-ranking IAS (Indian Administrative Service) offi-
cer, with texts on his writing board that could only be described as sacred
scriptures, innate to his office.
With the transfer of the office of karn. am to Village Administrative Of-
ficers (VAOs), some being Dalit through reservations, and the passing of
the Right to Information Act in 2005 (giving access to court judgments and
weakening bureaucratic deniability), the sacred-texts-become-government
documents were now, for the activists, ‘liberation documents’ (vit.ivu pat-
tiram). Dalit NGO workers, invariably seen carrying a heavy load of land
record files, ready to pull out for reference the relevant numbered file with
details on the first petition, etc., instantiate Hull’s view of the bureaucratic
file as a technology (an actant) that makes a phenomenon real, a case action-
able (2012: 116). Activists spoke to Sundara Babu of the sense of pride at
knowing the land survey maps and records better than the Revenue Officer,
at having command of those things previously denied (knowledge, records,
property) ‘which made us Dalit’; ‘removing one by one the chains of slav-
ery’. Bureaucrats, in their turn, trivialize such self-esteem, mocking Dalits
who come to the office to pursue a case, saying ‘file number such and such
has come’. ‘So we are reduced to a file’, says a Dalit woman; and when she
turns to object, saying that, ‘what is fundamental to us is being ridiculed’,
the officer quickly replies, ‘Oh, no, no, I didn’t mean that, I was just refer-
ring to…’.
37. The Dalit Panchami Land Restoration Movement followed commissions of enquiry into
the violence, empowered by the Madras High Court ruling in 1992 that all ‘DC’ (Depressed
Classes, i.e. Dalit) lands should be returned to their rightful Dalit owners (see Samraj, 2006).
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However, the bureaucracy is not moved to action by documents them-
selves. The ‘bureaucratic ground for favorable decisions’ has to be prepared
(Hull, 2012: 155) by the popular support built in villages in the form of
the Ambedkar Pēravai (or ‘Front’), an aggregate of youth/women’s associa-
tions in whose name (rather than the NGO’s) mass submissions were made
by Dalit women at the sub-district Revenue Officer’s jamabanthi-, or land
tribunal, to assign Panchami land. For example, in 2008, 600 people sub-
mitted petitions at one jamabanthi for around 220 acres of land in eight
villages of Villupuram district. The petitioners’ written demands to officials
for their legal rights were unclothed in conventional idioms of praise and
prayer (Cody, 2009). When the response to the demands was delayed, street
protests followed, as well as poster campaigns in local towns, naming offi-
cials who were blocking the process. When the case continued to drag on,
the Pēravai organized a roadblock, tying up cattle and goats at a highway
junction; impromptu shelters were erected, and women created hearths and
started preparing food on the road — it was an occupation. The Revenue Di-
vision Office was gheraoed (encircled/picketed); a memorandum was sent
to the Chief Minister in Chennai and Union Ministers in Delhi.
Practices of the state are used to put pressure on the state. For exam-
ple, the erection of notice boards on plots of land declared as Panchami
becomes officialized and ceremonialized with photographs of the Tahsildar
(sub-district revenue officer) in situ, so that when upper-caste landowners
rip them out, it is the Revenue Department that has to respond to the acts
of trespass and vandalism. Pēravai notices carry maps, statistics and warn-
ings of legal action, including calls for the Tahsildar to be arrested under
the PoA law for inaction on an atrocity — the appropriation of SC land.
Here the PoA signals the legal as much as the caste basis of the claim, and
it is a warning to the state as much as to landowning castes; but it is also
able to implicate both potential opponents. So, when a group of Vanniyar
(non-Dalit) women arrived to reoccupy a plot of Panchami land (mirroring
Dalit street tactics) claiming rights from having cultivated the land for many
years, the NGO workers insisted that the police note it down as evidence of
a violation against Dalits, with the accompanying duty/threat of arrest. In
fact, here the PoA allows conflict over Panchami land to be individualized
so as to avoid caste conflict. Disputes, as Nicholas insists, are ‘only between
the illegal occupants or encroachers of “condition land” and landless Dal-
its’.38 In practice, use of this law is a device to draw police attention, and
attention to the police response.
Everything is done by the NGO activists to prevent the land issue trig-
gering a caste backlash because turning this into a ‘law and order’ problem
strengthens the hand of the bureaucracy. Potential conflicts with Vanniyar
caste landowners (mostly small farmers) are repeatedly deflected to the
38. Interview, November 2010. In other contexts, the PoA has triggered intensified caste poli-
tics, cementing dominant caste party political agendas (Carswell and De Neve, 2015).
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bureaucracy, the unseen site of caste power. But Dalit informal social links
to the Revenue Office are weak, so transactions there — the documents
placed on the officer’s desk — are transposed to the public arena of the
pre-announced street protest. Here the legal basis of the claim is advertised
with printed posters, naming Pēravai movement leaders and lawyers, ac-
companied by their photographs and phone numbers, to publicly invoke the
backing of a popular Dalit movement.
The NGO leaders themselves parade political power to the bureaucracy.
Eschewing the belted, tucked-in pant-shirt of the bureaucrat in favour of
politician’s white dhoti, male leaders like Nicholas signal power that sits
astride the oft-criticized party politics and NGO anti-politics; and when
Nicholas’s wife, elected Counsellor and Ambedkar Pēravai women’s leader,
arrives at the Revenue Office with an entourage of community animators
and DLRF activists on a courtesy visit, ahead of land petitions, and is guided
swiftly to the Tahsildar’s cabin and there greeted with respect and nervous-
ness on the face of the senior bureaucrat, those in the office are in no doubt
that influence lies behind the file-clutching animators.
But the animators, like their leaders, leave the caste basis of the claims
unstated and emphasize the civil justice base. Their self-presentation in the
Revenue Office carefully diverts attention from their own caste identity,
for example, by signalling religious identities. So one presents himself as
Christian, another arrives with forehead marked with sandal paste in a typ-
ical middle-class Hindu manner; the point being: when you go with a file
on a caste question you emphasize religion. Quite different, then, from the
caste-invoking erection of Ambedkar statues or cooking beef on occupied
Panchami land which characterizes the cultural politics of other Dalit move-
ments (Mosse, 2012a: 223). A reflexive awareness is brought to dealings
with a socially heterogeneous bureaucracy. Animators build relationships
with senior bureaucrats, often outsiders to the district — for instance, the
female Brahman revenue official who they address as akkā, ‘elder sister’,
but who with deft evasion and a polite bureaucratic claim to powerlessness,
moves the file quickly to the Collector lest her name and family get impli-
cated in poster campaigns in the town. Their real aim is to bring the power of
a popular movement to dealings with those junior officials who participate in
the same networks of caste power as landowners in the villages, and whose
politician kinsmen will understand the significance of a potential vote-bank
behind the NGO workers.
The recovery of extensive tracts of Panchami land re-registered for land-
less Dalit women (but evading caste-based contention) was a significant
achievement.39 This has not been without challenges, for example, retain-
ing a floating body of animators, the erosion of villagers’ interest by bu-
reaucratic attrition, varied capacity across a land rights NGO network. But
39. According to C. Nicholas (pers. comm. June 2020) around 3,000 acres have been recovered
from ‘caste Hindus’ in the northern districts of Tamil Nadu in the past two decades.
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the principal theme here is not the unstable combination of ‘movement
work’ and donor-linked ‘NGOing’ that we saw with NESA-HRFDL, nor
the much-criticized ‘absorption’ of social movement activism ‘into the bu-
reaucratic structures of NGOs’ (Ismail and Kamat, 2018: 572). Rather, the
case demonstrates the performativity of Dalit rights work by what is simul-
taneously (and here non-contradictorily) an NGO and a social movement
with political force, skilfully negotiating antagonistic relations of caste and
state power through vernacular tactics of protest, well-honed to target lo-
cal revenue officers. Of course, the external funding is not incidental, but
the characteristic NGO ‘disjuncture between funding streams and the so-
cial spheres from which they draw their support’ (ibid.) is not the critical
point. Indeed, as DLRF shows and Jaoul (2017: 618–20) notes, such funding
allows autonomy from clientelist relations with the bureaucrats and politi-
cians. Overall, we are led to question attempts to dichotomize the ‘technical
proceduralism’ of the professional NGO and the sociability and ‘theatrical-
ity’ of Dalit political movements (pace Jaoul, 2017; see also Bornstein and
Sharma, 2016).
Put another way, this is a demonstration of the extraordinary skill, con-
tinuity of purpose, strong and savvy leadership, and resources required for
Dalits to organize access to their legal entitlements locally, rather than by
means of ‘higher-order’ platforms. But when this NGO network was ex-
panded and re-purposed to the wider ambition of resisting the new policy
(from 2007) of the Tamil Nadu government creating land banks and indus-
trial parks for investors in new industry, enabled by the Special Economic
Zones (SEZ) Act of 2005 (Bommier, 2016: 113), the NGO coalition came
up against far more intractable challenges.
A Failed Claim against Corporate Land Acquisition of Dalit Village Land
The case in question was opposition to the takeover of common lands in the
Dalit village of Thervoy Kandigai (henceforth, Thervoy) which fell within a
regional hub for automotive industries around Chennai, by the State Indus-
tries Promotion Corporation of Tamilnadu (SIPCOT) for lease to the French
multinational tyre company Michelin in 2007. This is not the place to de-
scribe what is an extraordinarily complex and protracted (seven-year) case
in which Sundara Babu was a close participant-observer. But the salient
elements of the case are that a DLRF-formed coalition led by C. Nicholas
sought to resist the acquisition of Dalit village common land, held as critical
to livelihoods. A familiar repertoire of local public demonstrations (sit-ins,
roadblocks, hunger strikes fronted by women) was deployed in dealing with
the State, and the campaign widened nationally, with representations to na-
tional commissions on Scheduled Castes and human rights.
Dalit identity and caste were, again, de-emphasized in order to widen the
campaign. At the time, the Dalit Land Rights Federation generalized itself as
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the State-level Tamil Nadu Land Rights Federation (TNLRF) with an anti-
SEZ, anti-globalization, anti-neoliberal agenda. Locally, the campaign tried
to attract the support of adjacent villages by broadening the issue from land
to industrial pollution and the threat to water and environment from a rub-
ber factory on the doorstep, mobilizing an anti-pollution padayatra (on-foot
protest), invoking the Bhopal disaster and circulating scare stories of ba-
bies born without eyes (Bommier, 2016: 146). The issue entered the agenda
of national advocacy organizations, student bodies, a concerned urban elite
and political party manifestos. Public interest litigation was a key weapon to
enforce the duty of the Indian state to protect villagers’ rights. Meanwhile
the advocacy coalition extended to France, through INGO CCFD’s media-
tion, where (from 2012) grievances were pressed against Michelin through
appeal against violation of OECD guidelines for corporate responsibility in
relation to human rights and social and environmental impacts.
In the end, the coalition failed to halt the factory. From this we learn —
and there is no better account than Bommier’s (2016) PhD thesis — about
the failure to establish Dalit entitlements around this land. Tactics combin-
ing local protests, judicialized activism and NGO advocacy, effective in lo-
cal Panchami land claims, were now outdone by the interlinked interests
of the corporations, the State-level bureaucracy, political parties, the Indian
courts and the international regulatory apparatus.
It became clear that in this claim against land dispossession, DLRF lacked
control over the terms of dispute. The high-level formal processes to which
social activists turned not only upscaled or de-localized the issue, they also
took the contention out of their hands. For one thing, the separation of public
(state) and private (company) responsibilities protected industry from the le-
gal claims of communities by allowing a global corporation like Michelin to
disown its responsibility, which was discarded to mechanisms of the demo-
cratic local State who delivered it land as ‘free from all encumbrances’40
as it was stripped of vegetation and protected by high wire — and legal —
fences. Moreover, in this case the land was ‘common’ rather than privately
owned land, marking the government’s policy turn from ‘a market logic of
bargaining [for compensation of private owners] … towards a[n internal]
bureaucratic process of land conversion within the state apparatus, without
perceived need to engage with land owners’ (Bommier, 2016: 80). Footholds
for resistance to land loss were scarce.
Beside land category and procedural loopholes, what this case illustrates
is the importance — and in this case the failure — of activism in the realm of
agenda setting, or the meta-politics of ‘framing’ (Fraser, 2005). Corporate
and business-friendly interests were able to infiltrate the legal and regulatory
systems most significantly by shaping the terms of what was a legitimate
claim, what was ‘reasonable’, what constituted the ‘public’ (or national)
40. Memorandum of Understanding between Government of Tamil Nadu and Michelin India
Tamil Nadu Tyres Pvt. Ltd, sec. Schedule 1.(b) (in Bommier, 2016: 207).
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interest, for example jobs in industry not protection of village resources
(Bommier, 2016). By the same token, when the activist coalition sought
to politicize the land-grab issue (following this failure to get redress), they
found space in the public arena for villagers’ land rights diminished by the
now-dominant narrative of industrialization and jobs (ibid.).
As activists withdrew from processes within which they found them-
selves voiceless, and the space to politicize the land rights issue narrowed,
the coalition itself lost coherence and people started to negotiate for com-
pensation and jobs. As we have already described, there is a proneness to
‘splitting’ of coalitions tying together different agendas and constituencies
into ‘spectacular but temporary displays of connection across the conti-
nents, largely mediated by specialized organizations, technologies and en-
trepreneurs’ (Tilly and Wood, 2015: 123, quoted in Bommier, 2016: 335).
The common cause, fabricated out of villages divided by faction, class, re-
ligious denominations and historical conflicts over water, was easily unrav-
elled into individual bargaining.
The contests over agenda setting that enable or block claim making re-
turn us to where this article began, with efforts to recognize a field of Dalit
rights. This is to say, the meta-politics in the Thervoy case concerned the
framing of not only what is at issue (rights over land) but also who are
the relevant subjects. In this case, Dalits — or specifically Dalit women —
were not constituted as rights-bearing subjects. Unlike with Panchami land,
there was no underpinning legal basis to the land claim as Dalits. This was
‘wasteland’ under State title following reclamation from landlords through
post-Independence land-ceiling legislation, claims to which resulted from
de facto cultivation (under ‘land to the tiller’ legislation), not Dalit identity.
In Thervoy, the land was uncultivated and the campaign unable to specify
Dalit women as the deprived and properly entitled vulnerable group. More-
over, locally this was perceived as a Thervoy village not a Dalit issue. If
anything, Dalits in neighbouring villages had competing interests over such
land, especially as water catchments feeding irrigation systems.
Although, formally, the Dalit basis of the Thervoy claim was unstuck,
land and identity were not so easily separated for those resisting alienation
of their common land. As with Panchami, the claim to land was also a claim
to the citizenship that, for them, land represented. Once the tyre company
project was inescapable, those representing the village set out demands to
Michelin in terms of permanent jobs, gas connections to replace lost fu-
elwood supply, reassigned grazing land, houses, etc. and, significantly, a 2
per cent share in the Michelin factory profits. The demands were such as
to claim what land represented for Dalits, namely recognition and social
inclusion as a historical rights-bearing community, and shareholders in the
ongoing productive value of the land, hence in the corporation and its gov-
ernance (Bommier, 2016: 169–70).
To Michelin, such claims were as barren of rationality as the unencum-
bered wasteland they industrialized (ibid.: 323–24). Dalit villagers could
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only be treated as generic clients, a population of customers or welfare bene-
ficiaries of CSR gifts (health camps, schools, water tanks). These were not
entitlements, but philanthropic allocations, which also fuelled division and
selective sell-out in already politically factionalized villages (ibid.: 207–
08). Meanwhile, the company appointed mostly upper-caste contractors to
supply trucks and bulldozers, and outsiders to permanent skilled jobs. Lo-
cals, regarded as unsuited to core roles of a ‘technologically-advanced and
efficient company’, could at best access temporary unskilled work in con-
struction, as guards or gardeners (ibid.: 323). While stripped of the ability to
assert claim-bearing identities, when it came to job recruitment it was clear
that Dalits continued to be subject to direct or indirect identity/category-
based discrimination as ‘costs to the company’ were reduced by ‘delocaliz-
ing’ the labour force and avoiding the social claims against work-time from
local family events (marriages, funerals) or festivals.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We learn from this article how NGOs in south India brought caste into de-
velopment discourse, and centralized Dalits as internationally recognized
sufferers of injustice and bearers of rights. The vibrant Dalit politics of caste
in the 1990s did not itself bring caste into international NGO development
discourse as a kind of ‘grassroots globalization’, certainly not independent
of processes internal to international human rights institutions and the or-
ganizational logics of INGOs like Oxfam producing strategic responses to
goals of structural change and a rights-based approach.
In the first case examined, these responses opened new space and re-
sources for a Dalit rights agenda, promoted through judicialized activism
and region-wide network forms, in alliance with Dalit movements. These
mobilized ideas as much as people (Alvarez, 2009: 178), reorganizing
categories of INGO/NGO/CBO as means and ends. The ‘scale making’
articulated local caste struggles into the discourse and instruments of Dalit
human rights, essential for small Dalit NGOs whose activism was stymied
by local caste and bureaucratic power. But the wide-ranging network forms
implied an amalgam of NGOs’ largely discursive ‘movement work’ and
their organizational relations, rendered critically unstable by repurposing
the network to deliver post-tsunami rehabilitation. The resulting collapse
of the network also marked an INGO turn from caste and Dalit rights in
strategic policy goals.
The second case involved successful claims over appropriated Dalit land
through procedural activism and vernacular tactics of protest that targeted
the local state itself. While claimed rights as Dalits were embedded in the
historic Panchami land category, contests were intentionally removed from
the context of inter-caste conflict. But when the Dalits of Thervoy village
sought to retain their village common land against State-mediated corpo-
rate takeover they failed in their claims both to land and to rights-bearing
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identities. NGO ‘scaling’ was rendered ineffective by external as well as
internal effects. The coalition and campaign that appealed to international
fora was unable (a) to pursue a ‘first-order’ issue of justice, that is rights
to resources (land) in face of State–corporate interests; and (b) to contest
the ‘meta-level’ injustice concerning ‘who counts as a subject of justice’
(Fraser, 2005: 80) that lay behind legal decisions: what counted (a claim on
common land) and who counted (Dalits as shareholding citizens).
We have shown the importance of international policy and the agenda-
setting work of NGOs and social movements especially to the ‘second-
order’ framing of who counts (what identities) as subjects of justice and
development. But we have also revealed the contingency of discursive
framing that gives Dalits the ‘right to have rights’, and the significance
of the inherent instability of the NGO–donor institutional space brought
into play (Lewis and Schuller, 2017). Actor categories (INGO/NGO/CBO,
networks, movements, fronts) and their moral evaluations, and definitions
of means and ends, turn out to be open to manipulation, especially in
India’s ‘crowded … market for social and political entrepreneurs’ (Jenkins,
2010: 423). How action is represented is consequential, especially for
donor-mediated investments and resource flows, and hence for those whose
struggles for justice depend on them.
Despite such fragility, Dalit organizations (NGOs, movements, parties)
did make significant advances in realizing rights, reducing untouchabil-
ity or debt bondage, improving resource access, dignity and self-respect
in the 2000s. Today’s nationalist politics brings authoritarian restrictions
to civil society activism and is notably more hostile to a focus on caste
and mobilization for rights. By 2011 in Tamil Nadu use of the phrase ‘hu-
man rights’ in the name of any NGO had been banned.41 Discussing such
trends with Picherit (2018: 361), Ramappa, a Dalit NGO leader in Andhra
Pradesh, comments, ‘We used to do dharna, now we have to hide in secret
places’. Pitcherit describes a sense of disenchantment (ibid.). Others de-
scribe the rise of clientelist relationships with dominant caste (mainstream)
businesses, corporations, NGOs or political parties (Gorringe, 2017), often
on unfavourable terms for Dalits who enter competitive pursuit of individ-
ual interests. The casualized, migratory work of the poorest limits the likeli-
hood of local collective action among Dalit women and men who now face
less visible and actionable forms of exclusion in the economy (see Shah
et al., 2018). As caste discrimination is reproduced in the informal relations
of the economy (Mosse, 2018), market inclusion is the context for caste
41. On 17 December 2011, the Times of India reported that ‘the Madurai bench of the Madras
high court ordered notice to authorities to ban the usage of the word “human rights” in the
name by any society, NGO or association’, upholding a 2009 formal resolution from the
Tamil Nadu government. See: http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/articleshow/11140093.
cms?utm_source=contentofinterest%26utm_medium=text%26utm_campaign=cppst
(accessed 3 April 2020).
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discrimination, just as in the political field democratic politics is the condi-
tion for anti-Dalit reaction: ‘high democracy’ with ‘low civility’ as Wagh-
more (2013: 199) aptly puts it.
Behind this weakened Dalit civil society activism may be a global trend
(Ismail and Kamat, 2018) towards tighter regulation of NGOs’ rights-based
work and its substitution by corporate social responsibility (CSR). Here,
Dalits are ‘misrecognized’ (Fraser, 2005), refused recognition as historical
subjects and allowed only to be consumers, clients or welfare beneficiaries
of state/corporate programming. For all the instability of the brokering mid-
dle ground, NGOs did enable a kind of claim making and social recognition
which is impossible within the new individualized state anti-poverty pro-
grammes or CSR welfare taking their place. By comparison, the NGOs ear-
lier vilified as capturing activism or as2009 agents of capitalism stabilizing
the neoliberal order (Kamat, 2002), seem positively benign. Meanwhile, it is
suggested, polarized and less negotiable conditions of social humiliation
produce new forms of Dalit activism, not only on the street but through
film and especially social media; and new questions about the contemp-
orary forms of social exclusion and assertion invite further ethnographic
engagement.
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